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Abstract 
The moral appropriateness1 of shame  
In this article I explore the much neglected moral emotion of 
shame and consider the senses in which it may be regarded as 
morally appropriate. I argue that there is a connection between 
coming to terms with shame for those who feel ashamed, and 
judgments concerning its moral appropriateness. The 
elucidation of normative connections between shame, self-
respect and autonomy implies the need to accept certain 
aspects of shame as regrettable yet, sometimes, as valuable.  
Opsomming 
Die morele gepastheid van skaamte  
In hierdie artikel ondersoek ek die hoogs verwaarloosde morele 
emosie van skaamte en oorweeg die betekenisse waarin dit as moreel 
aanvaarbaar en gepas beskou kan word. Die verband tussen die 
aanvaarding van skaamte vir dié wat skaamte ervaar; en oordele 
aangaande die morele gepastheid daarvan word ook beredeneer. Die 
verheldering van normatiewe verbintenisse tussen skaamte, self-
respek en outonomie impliseer die behoefte om enkele aspekte van 
                                          
1 In general, I maintain that emotions are sometimes morally appropriate –  which 
is to say, very roughly, that each emotion type has instances that respond to 
genuine value. This is as true of the more attractive cases such as compassion 
as of several emotions philosophers often reject as vicious, such as shame. 
These emotions, too, are sometimes responses to genuine values. My 
arguments will turn partly on some speculative empirical claims, which, 
however, may ultimately be disproved. But even if my hypothesis is wrong, its 
defence may prove useful by broaching connections between values and 
distinctively human concerns. 
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skaamte as betreurenswaardig, maar soms ook as waardevol te 
aanvaar. 
1. Introduction 
Some philosophers are ashamed of shame. According to Aristotle 
(Nicomachean Ethics 4.1128b), 
Shame should not be described as an excellence; for it is more 
like a passion than a state ... [And this] passion is not becoming 
to every age, but only to youth... [A]n older person no one would 
praise for being prone to the sin of disgrace, since we think we 
should not do anything that need cause this sense.  
On the other hand, Plato (Laws 2.671c) praises shame as that which 
will prevent man from doing what is dishonourable. My own stance 
on shame is closer to the Platonic than to the Aristotelian view. I 
shall defend the view that the experience of shame may serve as an 
important warning signal that one’s moral values are under threat. 
This warning signal carries with it the important implication that 
fostering receptivity to properly felt shame is an important edu-
cational goal. That Aristotle should have declined this implication, 
except for the young, may be considered as one of his infamous 
empirical mistakes – in this case, the psychological error of failing to 
accept the fact that no one is wise at all times and we all need to 
experience shame from time to time in order to identify and correct 
our inevitable lapses and mistakes. One might question whether we 
need shame to do this. Does not our sense of guilt come into play in 
this respect? Many philosophers (Rawls, 1971; Deigh, 1983; Taylor, 
1985) and some psychologists (Piers & Singer, 1953, 1971; 
Tangney & Fischer, 1995) have maintained that shame is not a 
response to moral wrong-doing, but something we feel when we 
have had a shock to our self-esteem, or when we discover our 
shortcomings in regard to what we want to be, or when our failure to 
be or act as befits our station in life is publicly exposed. They have 
maintained that if shame is a moral emotion, it is more primitive and 
less useful than guilt – one for which both individuals and cultures 
would be the better if they could move beyond it.  
I begin by providing an overview of various theoretical perspectives 
on shame and related emotions and concepts with particular 
reference to their implications for morality. Among such a con-
stellation of concepts, self-respect is singled out for detailed 
examination. I try to establish connections between shame and self-
respect that have been overlooked and have led to mis-
understanding concerning their proper relation. I argue that morally 
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appropriate shame is compatible with autonomous moral judgment 
by unpacking what is involved in the role of shame in influencing 
morally sound judgment and morally appropriate conduct. My goal is 
to recognise the interplay of both autonomous and other-influenced 
judgments in identifying our shortcomings and seeking to respond 
critically to them. I want to show that adopting this strategy will lead 
to appreciation of the moral appropriateness of experiencing and 
accepting shame.  
2. Situating shame  
While most psychologists and educators have long recognised the 
moral importance of guilt, they have had more ambivalent feelings 
about shame, the ”ugly” moral emotion (Tangney, 1991). I want to 
suggest that both are important moral emotions (although I shall not 
be much concerned with guilt, which, in my opinion, has been both 
over-emphasised and over-analysed), since they generally make 
people conform to rules and uphold the social order. Shame and its 
close cognate, embarrassment, are probably even more important in 
daily life, since they are potentially at work in all public interactions 
and serve to regulate unacceptable and, sometimes, immoral 
behaviour.2 A purely self-interested creature would find reasons to 
restrain her behaviour in cases where norm violations would lead to 
punishment, but she would not feel guilt over harms that only she 
knew about, or experience shame over the discovery of her own 
moral depravity, or even embarrassment at being caught in a lie. 
Indeed, the complete lack of shame, embarrassment, and guilt is 
one of the most salient hallmarks of the psychopath, along with the 
absence of sympathy (Cleckley, 1955). 
• The guilt-shame dichotomy 
There is a common distinction, and not a negligible one between 
shame and guilt. The invocation of a sharp distinction between 
“shame societies” and “guilt societies” is, for instance, a common-
place in the social sciences. The former (“shame societies”) is 
                                          
2 In a number of recent studies conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, 
researchers found that “people refer to themselves as experiencing shame 
when they believe that a real flaw of their self has been revealed [while] they 
refer to themselves as experiencing embarrassment when they believe that 
others have reason to think a flaw has been revealed ... The data are 
inconsistent with the view that embarrassment is tied to violations of 
conventions, whereas shame is tied to moral failings” (Sabini, Garvey & Hall, 
2001:104).
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apparently characterised by heteronomy – avoidance of wrongful 
action for fear of being found out and ridiculed by others, the 
reaction of running or hiding away if caught. On the other hand the 
latter distinction (“guilt societies”) is characterised by autonomy – 
avoidance caused by one’s own sense of guilt, the reaction of self-
loathing and of wanting to compensate one’s victims because of the 
wrongs done to them.3 The idea seems to be that in shame one’s 
assessment of failure is merely external, whereas in guilt it is purely 
internal, that is, only concerned with the subject’s own norms and 
evaluations without regard to the verdict of a detached observer or 
the gaze of an external audience.  
It is tempting to consider guilt an independent emotion – one 
focused on the individual’s own moral failure, which has caused 
harm and is thought to stand in need of rectification – and it may be 
possible to imagine people experiencing some sort of shame without 
experiencing guilt. However, the conceptual allure of the Kantian 
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, reflected in the 
above guilt-shame dichotomy, appears to be waning. Bernard 
Williams (1993:93) claims that guilt and shame overlap to a 
significant extent and we will not understand either unless we take 
both seriously. While there is a distinction to be drawn between 
these two concepts, conceptualising them as stark opposites 
overlooks important connections, as I shall argue below. 
In addition to conceptual considerations, there are factual reasons 
for rejecting the conflation of shame with “outer” and guilt with 
“inner”. Williams (1993:81 ff.) points out that in the paradigmatic 
shame society of ancient Greece, one could experience equally 
strong shame over unworthy conduct which would have resulted in 
dishonour had one been seen, as over unworthy conduct which, in 
fact, was seen. The most common Greek word for shame, aidos,4 
signifies an experience akin to that of being caught in public with 
one’s trousers down. Shame is the result of being seen by the wrong 
                                          
3 Piers and Singer (1971:63) write, “The prevailing criterion for distinguishing 
shame and guilt cultures has been the distinction between external and internal 
sanctions. If a culture depends primarily on external sanctions, it is considered 
to be a shame culture.”
4 It is naive to conclude that because the Greeks did not possess two separate 
words for what we call “shame” and “guilt”, their word aidos  could not cover the 
meanings of both. As Williams (1993:90 ff.) amply demonstrates, aidos includes 
elements of inner sanctions, indignation, reparation, and forgiveness – the 
things nowadays typically associated with guilt rather with than shame. 
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people in the wrong condition. People could also be ashamed of 
being admired by the wrong audience in the wrong way. For 
example, the emperor, in Hans Christian Anderson’s famous tale, 
might have felt equal shame if only he, and no one else in the 
audience, had grasped the meaning of the child’s revelation about 
his “new clothes”. Nothing in the nature of so-called “shame 
societies” thus precludes the possibility of personal moral con-
victions contradicting that of a “misled” majority. 
On the other hand, the judgment of the community frequently 
becomes internalised so that the gaze of the other accompanies the 
members of the community even when they happen to be alone. 
One is ashamed before the gaze of God just as one is ashamed 
before the gaze of the other. The difference is that one is ashamed 
before God’s gaze when one has in fact infringed the external moral 
authority, whereas one can be ashamed by the gaze of the other 
simply because of personal matters such as one’s intimate life or 
family problems that are no proper concern of the other. Consider 
the example of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden: 
they feel shame and try to hide themselves before God’s all-seeing 
gaze. They obviously develop a feeling of guilt – otherwise they 
would not apologise before God with the classic guilt-avoiding 
rationalisation of attempting to make others responsible for their own 
wrongdoing. 
Shame is implicit in emphases of the ways in which people monitor 
their own actions by viewing themselves from the standpoint of 
others. Telling a lie as a first reflex when being questioned is a well-
known technique for avoiding shame. Peter lied about being one of 
Jesus’ disciples, not because he was frightened, but because he 
was taken by surprise by the representatives of a community whose 
norms his master had clearly violated. His first reflex was to avoid 
shame.  
3. Shame, self-respect and autonomy 
In order to better understand shame, we need to examine its 
connections with self-respect and self-esteem. In an age character-
ised by the apparent relativity of values, there seems to prevail a 
surprising consensus on self-respect being one of the chief in-
gredients of a life worth living. Nevertheless, there is little agreement 
in relevant subject-related literature on the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for self-respect and on its relation to other concepts and 
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values.5 Thus we have various overly narrow analyses in which self-
respect is explained without the barest acknowledgement of other 
related concepts, including its sister-concept – self-esteem. We also 
see a number of overly broad accounts in which the extension of 
terms such as self-esteem, honour, pride, dignity, integrity are run 
together under the rubric of self-respect, making the latter concept 
bloated beyond good sense.  
Rawls provides a much-discussed treatment of “self-respect” in A 
Theory of Justice basically focusing upon people's opinions of 
themselves. Self-respect, according to Rawls (1971:441), “includes 
a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
conception of his good, his plan of life is worth carrying out ... [and 
also] a confidence in one’s own ability, insofar as it is within one’s 
power, to fulfil one’s intentions”. 
Like other critics, I am inclined to think that Rawls has confused self-
respect with self-esteem. I concur with the definition of self-esteem 
suggested by Robin Dillon (1995:134): “Self-esteem is the judgment 
that one is living congruently with one’s values and thus is or is 
becoming a kind of person it is worth being.” 
Self-esteem is generally taken to be a positive self-evaluation based 
upon perceived merits, such as talents and achievements, whereas 
self-respect, in its narrower sense, is often taken as an appropriate 
recognition of and response to one's status as a person with rights 
and responsibilities. What is important in self-respect is that it is a 
complex character trait involving a desire and a disposition “not to 
behave in a manner unworthy of oneself – that is, to shun behaviour 
that one views as contemptible, despicable and degrading” (Telfer, 
1995:109-110). 
This view fits our intuition that self-respect is a guardian of the other 
virtues and a preserver of moral character. It also raises the often 
discussed issue of whether shame is related to one’s self-respect or 
to one’s self-esteem. In favour of the former connection is, for 
example, the fact that the Greek word aidos can be translated both 
as “shame” and as “self-respect”. Gabriele Taylor (1985:77) claims 
that there is a case for linking shame with self-respect, while John 
Kekes (1988:286) claims that “in feeling shame, we feel the loss of 
self-respect”. David Sachs (1981:356), on the other hand, equates 
shame with a certain kind of self-disesteem. My analysis of shame, 
                                          
5 For an overview, see the Introduction in Dillon (1995). 
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above, helps us to dissolve the dispute by suggesting that shame 
signals the presence and persistence rather than the loss of self-
respect. The link between shame and self-esteem, on the one hand, 
consists in shame being a specific instance of that kind of negative 
self-evaluation for which self-disesteem is the global manifestation. 
Shame if pervasive and frequent enough will, thus, issue in global 
self-disesteem. 
• Shame as a moral emotion 
The point of the foregoing is to facilitate my discussion of the moral 
appropriateness of shame. I take “morally appropriate shame” to 
mean the kind of feeling that a basically good person feels upon 
realising that she has done something shameful, alternately, it is the 
kind of feeling that we expect someone who has done something 
shameful to feel. “She should be ashamed of herself” is not typically 
said about a person who does have the right feelings. The fact that a 
person does not feel the appropriate moral emotion is part of what 
makes her a bad person. As mentioned before, not everything of 
which one is ashamed can straightforwardly understood be of moral 
concern; people who are poor tend to be ashamed of this, as do 
people who are considered ugly. The fact that they feel shame about 
these matters may appear to have more to do with psychological 
tendencies and certain societal perceptions than with moral 
concerns. Accordingly, this has led to a distinction between natural 
and moral shame (Rawls, 1971:442-444). Whereas “natural shame 
is aroused by blemishes in our person, or by acts and attributes 
indicative thereof”, moral shame is revealed by the presence of 
defects or the lack of those characteristics and traits about which we 
would be justifiably proud.  
Kekes (1988:286) argues against this distinction by pointing out that 
the more important a commitment is, the more shameful is its 
violation. His point is that since all commitments whose violation is 
shameful are constituents of what we think of as good lives, the 
occurrence of shame is always significant. Certainly, Rawls’s dis-
tinction between natural and moral shame becomes tenuous, given 
the impact of shame on a person’s conception of a good life. I am 
inclined to think that, as Taylor (1985:84) puts it, shame is a moral 
emotion “not because sometimes, or even often it is felt when a 
person believes himself to have done something morally wrong, but 
rather because the capacity for feeling shame is so closely related to 
the possession of self-respect, and thereby to the agent’s own 
values”. 
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Taylor argues that attempting to avoid shame is one way of losing 
self-respect in so far as it sometimes tends to blur the values the 
person is committed to. She also believes that from this point of view 
“genuine” shame is always justified. The contrast between genuine 
shame and false shame is, however, more problematic than her 
example and brief discussion would suggest, so it is hard to 
determine what “genuine” shame is and, accordingly, to assess this 
claim. 
• The notion of conscience 
There are similar problems associated with the notion of conscience. 
I think there is merit in claiming that when one is justifiably ashamed 
of one’s conduct and character, the feeling of shame “can bear 
witness to an uncorrupted conscience” (Isenberg, 1980:374; original 
emphasis). The ethical sanction of an internal authority forms the 
pangs of conscience.6 We usually feel pangs of conscience if one of 
our thoughts or intentions does not meet our moral approval. 
External and internal authorities often collide, and then we are torn 
apart. On the other hand, we can feel pangs of conscience if we are 
ashamed of something, while in the judgment of our conscience we 
did the right thing and so should not be ashamed at all. 
Involuntariness attaches to both shame and pangs of conscience 
making both appear somewhat less than rational. 
• Why the suspicions about the value of feeling ashamed? 
Perhaps what has fuelled philosophers’ suspicions about the value 
of feeling ashamed is the way that shame seems to shift attentions 
away from what morality requires to what other people require us to 
do or be like. In shame we see ourselves in others’ eyes, and 
measure ourselves through standards that we may not share. The 
problem with shame, then, could be that a vulnerability to being 
shamed could be construed as indicating the agent's failure to 
sustain her own autonomous judgment about what morality requires. 
I shall argue against this interpretation. Given the worry that shame 
                                          
6 Consider that if my child cheats in an exam and is found out, it is not just my 
child who will be ashamed. One can warn someone not to bring shame and 
disgrace to one's country, family, school, or even gender. This is quite rational 
from the standpoint of external authority, yet entirely irrational from the position 
of individual conscience. Since conscience is individual and subjective in this 
sense, I can feel pangs of conscience only when I have transgressed the voice 
of my conscience. Yet if my wife or my child has done something against their 
conscience, I cannot feel pangs of conscience unless I am also personally guilty 
of something, say neglect, cowardice, or spoiling others. 
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signals a heteronomous and excessive concern with others’ 
opinions, any good defence of morally appropriate shame will have 
to show that, despite appearances, morally appropriate shame is 
compatible with autonomous moral judgment. However, it needs 
always to be borne in mind that morality is something practised with 
others in a social world. Taking others seriously as co-participants in 
a moral practice means giving their opinions “weight” – and thus the 
power to shame. 
Like all emotions, shame is about something: it has referents. It may 
relate to failure to achieve valued appearances, for example in looks 
or clothing (in this respect one might speak of “aesthetic” shame), 
failure to carry out some task to an expected standard (“perform-
ative” shame?), or – most importantly for my purposes – failure to 
conduct oneself in ways deemed proper, and to live in ways 
considered acceptable (moral shame). The complementary feeling 
of contempt may be unwarranted, if it is unrelated to any shameful 
or contemptible behaviour for which the despised can reasonably be 
held responsible. This is the case with class-based contempt, that is 
very different from what Michelle Mason (2003:234-272) refers to as 
properly focused contempt. Thus, as with other moral emotions, we 
can acknowledge the existence of shame without endorsing every 
instance of it as appropriate. We may even deem some sentiments 
of shame to be misjudged, for example, the shame of married men 
of my father's generation whose wives went out to work, which 
supposedly indicated that they were unable to “keep” them.  
• Shame and self-respect are linked 
Shame is in some ways the opposite of self-respect and pride, but 
they are also related. To experience shame is to feel inadequate, 
lacking in worth, and perhaps lacking in dignity and integrity.7
 
Self-
respect derives from a feeling that one is living a worthwhile life, and 
has confidence in one’s ability to do what one considers worthwhile. 
Although deeply private, self-respect is also a profoundly social 
emotion: It is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that how 
we live and what we do is worthwhile if there are no others who 
appreciate our actions (Rawls, 1971:440-441) and, as Adam Smith 
                                          
7 “If distress is the affect of suffering, shame is the affect of indignity, of defeat, of 
transgression, and of alienation …. While terror and distress hurt, they are 
wounds inflicted from outside which penetrate the smooth surface of the ego; 
but shame is felt as an inner torment, a sickness of the soul” (Tomkins, quoted 
in Sedgewick & Frank, 1995:133). 
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and many other writers emphasise, the approval of others is crucial 
for well-being, albeit, not just any others but those who are regarded 
as worthy of respect.  
Rom Harré suggests that actors continually seek out situations 
where they risk contempt and hence shame, in order to win respect, 
implying that unless we take such risks, we shall achieve little 
respect or self-respect (Harré, 1979). In this way, shame and self-
respect are linked. Those who never risk contempt because they 
never put their beliefs “on the line”, whatever the situation, are likely 
to be seen as lacking the courage of their convictions, or having no 
convictions or commitments and hence lacking character. The 
strategy fails because it, too, invites contempt. One might also feel 
shame about not having any convictions. Maintaining integrity in the 
face of pressures to bend is a prime source of respect and self-
respect but it is buttressed by the fear of the contempt and shame 
that failure would bring. Shame painfully brings home to us the brute 
fact that we have committed ourselves to be a certain way and that 
we did not live up to that commitment. Since the reason behind the 
commitment is that being that way is a good way of being, having 
failed, we feel bad about the way we are. An obvious question which 
then arises is: Is the possession of such feelings a necessary 
condition for change in outlook, conduct, and character? 
It might well be objected that our self-respect could be protected in 
less painful ways than through the experience of shame. The 
conceptual and historical connections between shame and guilt 
notwithstanding, Kekes (1988:282, 291-295) has argued that the 
same given objective of self-protection can be achieved “in less self-
destructive ways” than by experiencing shame, and even guilt – 
emotions that threaten to deplete our most important resources for 
self-improvement. For example, he argues, instead of flagellating 
ourselves with the stick of shame, we should concentrate on the 
attractions of the carrot, which our conception of a good life 
represents. Why, if we stray from our purpose, should we not learn 
to focus more on the appeal of the purpose from which we strayed 
rather than to wallow in self-condemnation? 
• The nature of human motivation 
Answers to Kekes’s question will necessarily be psychological and 
will have to do with the nature of human motivation. The first thing to 
notice is that people do, fortunately, learn from their mistakes. If we 
sweep all our mistakes and faltered attempts under the carpet to 
concentrate, instead, on the ultimate prize of all-round excellence, 
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we fail to utilise important possibilities for moral progress. Secondly, 
“ultimate prizes” tend to be less tangible in most people’s minds, and 
yield less easily to instant motivation than the dangers awaiting us 
along the way. For instance, most people are surely deterred from 
smoking by the imminent danger of the lung cancer they might incur 
in mid-life than by their abstract contemplation of a life of mental and 
physical well-being to which refraining from smoking might (perhaps) 
contribute. 
• Feelings of shame tied to the others’ imagined or actual 
contempt 
To return to the (italicised) question posed above. Feelings of 
shame seem intrinsically tied to the thought of social others' 
imagined or actual contempt. As human beings, it is simply a fact 
that we react to how others view or judge us. Even if we are aware 
of no inadequacies in our self and walk into a room where everyone 
turns and expresses contempt, it is incredibly difficult not to feel 
ashamed. Similarly it is extremely hard not to feel good about 
ourselves if we walk into a room and everyone looks on at us 
admiringly. And this good feeling can occur even if we were thinking 
disparaging thoughts about our self upon entering the room. Indeed 
human beings can and often do orient their lives to pursue the 
pleasures of recognition, admiration and honour and to avoid the 
pain of derision, contempt and dishonour. Our sense of shame can 
thus come to orient us to avoid contempt or derision as such rather 
than orienting us to avoid the actions that were originally judged to 
be bad and, perhaps, worthy of derision. 
• Primary fears attached to shame 
According to Piers and Singer (1953), the primary fears attached to 
shame are fears of being ridiculed, made the subject of gossip, 
subject to demeaning treatment, and of being ostracised or 
abandoned. Thus shame is strongly connected with the desire to 
conceal failings from others’ view, with the fear of exposure, and 
with anxiety for “how it will be for one’s life with others” if one acts 
shamefully (Williams, 1993:102). Shaming moral failures are para-
digmatically ones that might, if exposed, reduce one’s social 
standing in an actual group and might degrade the quality of one’s 
social interactions. Williams seems to leave open the possibility that 
others may shame us with their criticisms even where we disagree 
with their evaluation of us. Autonomous agents care about how they 
appear in the eyes of respected others. They care because they 
have a general respect for the other’s evaluative commitments, skill 
at moral reasoning and perceptiveness. That general respect 
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grounds the power to shame, and thus people may be shamed by 
particular criticisms that do not match their own particular self-
criticism. Alternatively, they may fail to maintain their own critical 
perspective in the face of others’ shaming contempt. In view of such 
considerations, Williams emphasises how the evaluative gaze of 
others, fears of exposure, anxiety about others’ contempt, that is, 
the social dimensions of shame, play a central role independently of 
our own self-assessments. At the same time, morally appropriate 
shame is ultimately tethered to the agent’s own evaluative 
standards, since she must choose whose evaluative judgments 
merit her respect. So while it is true that shame is always shame in 
the face of real social others who will interact with me differently if 
my moral failing is exposed, vulnerability to shame does not indicate 
abdication of individual judgment. On the contrary, individual judg-
ment is central to morally appropriate shame. 
• Shame and the recognition of moral shortcomings 
Williams raises important issues about the role of shame in 
influencing morally sound judgment and morally appropriate 
conduct. However, ultimately he fails to account for both the 
distinctively social character of shame and for the power of others' 
eyes to shame because he is unable to explain how being exposed 
to another who may view one with contempt and who may then 
interact with one differently can lead to a reconsideration of one's 
contemptible behaviour and problematic character traits. The power 
of the judgment of the other to exert influence upon our own 
opinions so that we come to see as failings what we had not 
previously identified as such is not recognised in his (or of anyone 
else's) account of shame. The fact is that the viewing other does not 
always share our own good opinion of ourselves. Being self-
absorbed to the point of narcissism, we may need to experience 
shame in order to help us to recognise our own limitations. So, I 
want to argue that the kind of shame identified as morally 
appropriate specifically includes shame over which the ashamed 
person has come to see the error of her ways through recognition of 
moral shortcomings. Such shortcomings must first be exposed to 
public view before they can become the source of shame; or, at 
least, the contempt that others would show us were our shortcoming 
to be exposed, must be clearly imaginable.  
• We narrow our lives in order to escape and avoid shame 
I am inclined to think that each of us, in our own characteristic ways, 
narrows our life in order to escape and avoid shame. Ashamed of 
shame, we learn to live with it but keep it out of awareness. In the 
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process, however, we choke off natural human emotions and 
desires. Unwilling to face shame, we settle instead for alienation. 
Conditioned by a deep fear of shame, we become alienated from 
ourselves, from other people, and from full participation in life. We 
never get away from shame – we just bury it. So it may be only in 
cases where shame is part of neurotic adaptation that we could, with 
any real prospect of success, seek to transcend it. For the rest, 
mere acceptance of it will do!  
4. The ability to confront shame tendencies within 
ourselves 
Recognising its prevalence within the individual as well as within 
society may facilitate the acceptance of shame. People who 
obsessively strive after perfection are as likely as not to be seeking 
to avoid persecution from inner feelings of shame. Their yearnings 
for uniqueness provoke feelings of shame and humiliation over such 
yearnings, and the vulnerability that they engender (due to the 
danger of resistance or denial of fulfilment or a response of rejection 
or contempt from the object of desire) define an essential element in 
what is essentially a narcissistic experience. According to Kohut 
(1971:154), shame arises when the exhibitionistic demands of “the 
narcissistic self” cannot be met. In almost all clinically significant 
instances of a recurrent propensity to remain mired in shame, the 
shame sufferer is characterised by a defective idealisation and by 
concentration on the narcissistic self. (Being “narcissistic” may be 
understood as a description of extreme self-absorption.) The 
ambitious, success-driven individual with a poorly integrated self-
concept and intense exhibitionistic narcissistic tensions may be most 
prone to experience shame. On the other hand, those who usually 
are condemnatory towards others, are as likely as those who 
habitually are self-deprecatory to be seeking to avoid deeper shame 
suffering through deflection of painful feelings from themselves onto 
others. If the goal is reduction of shame to manageable levels, those 
who are prone to shame need to find ways to confront the shame 
tendencies within themselves in order to attempt to lay foundations 
for a less damaging social and interpersonal environment. 
• Risks in the process of achieving respect and self-respect 
To show how ways to confront shame tendencies in themselves can 
be done, I need to return to Harré’s point about risk-taking, i.e., that 
unless we take risks, we shall achieve little respect from others or 
self-respect. It is important to recognise that events that seemingly 
call our selves into question – think of the dangers posed by whistle 
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blowing – really pose only challenges to be faced, for good or for ill. 
It is in the honest facing of those tests of self that we most especially 
find out of what stuff we are made. For it is how we face those 
inevitable defeats, those necessary failures, those painful rejections 
– not whether they were deserved – that matters most. An individual 
may emerge from such crises, such confrontations with self as 
shame hands us, either more solid and secure in her personhood, or 
more uncertain, self-doubting, and confirmed in defectiveness. 
Always there remains the possibility, if not the potential, for growth if 
one but takes the risk. And growth is at best a risky prospect. No 
one can ever claim, with anything even approaching certainty to 
know what the outcome might be. Thus the uncertainties of life 
provide us with the possibilities for restoring ourselves and for 
growth. 
Yet just as likely are the possibilities for the solidification of shame 
further within the emerging identity of an individual. One’s very 
identity may be based on shame. In such an event, defeats, failures, 
and rejections may no longer be actual but merely perceived as 
such. Simple awareness of a limitation may be sufficient to count as 
a mortal wounding of the self, a new confirmation of inherent 
defectiveness. Mistakes, which ought to be expected in the course 
of daily functioning, become occasions of agonising self-torture.  
• Focus on the enduring character traits 
If the deleterious effects of shame are to be overcome, we need to 
focus on character traits, i.e., those enduring qualities of persons 
thought to speak to their worth as persons and which are plausibly 
regarded as within their domain of responsibility. There is moral 
philosophical precedent for holding people responsible for their 
characters – ordinary folk wisdom, typically, does the same. Now 
people who wish to overcome character traits of which they are 
ashamed may have recourse to various strategies. Like alcoholics 
who wish to reform, they may avoid circumstances that may lead 
them to backslide on their resolutions. Self-awareness and vigilance 
combined with the support of trusted and knowledgeable significant 
others may serve as pillars upon which to lean in their endeavours 
to replace character weakness of which they are ashamed so as to 
become better persons. 
• Deliberate what kind of person you want to be 
To be a person is, roughly, to be a creature with a capacity to care 
not merely about things or ends in the world but also about yourself 
and the motives for action that are truly your own. To care about 
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yourself in this way is to put yourself at stake in your engagement 
with particular things, projects, ends, etcetera – things that you 
thereby value. This is, in effect, to define the kind of life it is worth 
your living and so your identity as this particular person. Yet to be a 
person is not merely to have a capacity to evaluate yourself in this 
way – it is also to have the capacity to be responsible for these 
evaluations – and so for your identity – in virtue of the inter-
connected capacities to deliberate about what kind of person you 
want to be and to exercise a form of control over your cares and 
values so as actually to acquire this identity.8 As Ben Ze’ev 
(2000:514) remarks, “More than other emotions, shame expresses 
our deepest values and commitments; freeing ourselves from shame 
implies unloading these values and commitments.” 
• Conflicting values and one’s identity as a person 
Being irresolute in the face of conflicting obligations can leave one 
feeling ashamed. The way to overcome such feelings would appear 
to require that one recognise that in some interpersonal contexts 
certain traits of character are appropriately viewed as more salient 
and treated as more important in assessing the degree to which one 
embodies the moral ideal that one’s obligations presuppose. 
Assume that I value both being a good father and being a good 
academic. In particular cases, these two values might conflict. Thus, 
when my daughter breaks her leg and needs to be taken to the 
hospital just as my office hours are about to begin, I decide that, 
although attending office hours is a part of being a good academic, 
in this case I should take care of my daughter. Should I then feel 
ashamed for failing to uphold my value of being a good academic? 
Of course not – taking care of my daughter in these circumstances 
just is living as I ought – just is upholding my identity as this person, 
who has multiple and sometimes conflicting values. Consequently, 
whether or not any particular action (or omission) amounts to 
success or failure at upholding particular values depends in part on 
the place it has within a broader rational structure of values 
constitutive of one's identity. It is in this sense that particular values 
are each parts of one's identity as this person.  
• An inter-connectedness among one’s values 
A particular value is not intelligible as my value unless it already has 
a place within this broader rational structure constitutive of my 
                                          
8 This is a structural feature of Frankfurtian accounts of values now in vogue. See, 
for example, Frankfurt (1988; 1999). For an alternative see Helm (2001). 
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identity. We cannot understand the inter-connections among one's 
values – one’s “priorities”, as we might call them – to be an optional 
extra slapped on top of one’s values after the fact. Rather, the 
commitments one undertakes to particular values must already 
understand them to be a part of one’s identity as this particular 
person, and these commitments therefore presuppose a broader 
commitment to the import of the person as such. Indeed, in being 
susceptible to these commitments, one must be responsive to the 
overall structure of one’s values constitutive of one’s identity, lest 
one feel unwarranted shame at such things as failing to hold office 
hours when one’s daughter is in need. As Kekes (1988:286) points 
out: “Shame ... is proportionate to the centrality of the unfulfilled 
commitment to our conception of a good life.”  
Clearly, though, the scope and power of shame makes its trans-
cendence by the individual a problematic if not quite not insuperable 
matter. According to Sally Planalp (1999:177), “[Shame] is the 
ultimate moral weapon before which we all cringe because it is the 
most strongly evaluative, the most painful, and probably the most 
powerful emotion of them all.” 
In less severe shame experiences, for instance, the shame sufferer 
may try to repair the harm: the individual who is insulted may 
demand an apology; the person who behaves shamefully tries to 
behave in more socially approved fashion; the shame sufferer seeks 
an opportunity to redeem herself. 
• We are our own harshest judges 
According to the well-known researcher into shame, Léon Wurmser 
(1981:84), the “aim” of shame “at its most differentiated” is 
“changing one’s character”. Motivation for such change is not simply 
a function of the severity of the painfulness of shame – although this 
should not be underestimated. As we saw earlier, experiencing 
shame need not be about relinquishing our autonomous judgment – 
indeed, it seldom is.9 But how should the shame sufferer respond to 
the characteristic self-reproach that is shame? A good starting-point 
is to recognise that in many instances of shame, the criticism and 
disapproval of others reflect primarily the projection of our 
shortcomings onto others. In other words, we experience our shame 
                                          
9 I agree with Carl Schneider (1977:138) who writes, “The point is not to throw out 
shame and enthrone autonomy; but to recover an appropriate sense of shame 
and of the mutuality that is its foundation.”
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through the eyes of another assuming that her verdict of us will be 
the same as our own verdict and that she views us with contempt. 
But others, no matter how significant, just are not as interested in 
our deficiencies as we are; they have their own concerns and 
preoccupations. It might thus come as a revelation to us that no one 
could judge us as harshly as we judge ourselves. Such recognition 
may then lead us to the realisation that much of the painfulness of 
shame can be alleviated by the awareness that shame largely is a 
product of our own doing. But that does not mean that shame should 
be treated as a disease to be eradicated. To do so is to endanger 
our sense of place in the greater structure of life and of society.  
• “Shame has the seeds of betterment in it …”  
To conclude: insofar as shame promotes social responsibility, moral 
conformity and cohesion, it may be deemed a positive and creative 
force (which is not to accept that other forms of coercion, such as 
contempt, with which social norms are enforced are always 
justified). Shame can be an inhibitory emotion preventing one from 
saying anything that another may deem inappropriate or shameful. 
In so far as it diminishes estimations of self-esteem and self-respect, 
it can be seen as destructive. Because of its particular dynamics, 
shame has a singular capacity to reveal the self to itself. The 
process of revelation that occurs in shame is not necessarily a 
narrow or static one. Through the experience of shame, identity may 
not only be confirmed, but also shaped, enlarged and put into 
perspective. Initial harsh judgment, in due course, may be replaced 
by more sober assessment. The immediate pain in shame is often 
the sting of self-negation – a more sustained look may reveal an 
underlying core of positive belief and self-evaluation. If all respect for 
the self is lost, the knowledge that the self has betrayed a friend will 
not arouse shame. This ambivalence is typical of shame. A person 
may experience self-contempt or numbness, but shame implies that 
a person cares. These considerations lead to a more hopeful 
conclusion – “Shame has the seeds of betterment in it ... It is future-
directed and lives from hope” (Pruyser, 1968:323). 
5. Conclusion 
In this article I explored shame as an attitude and emotion that 
exerts wide-ranging impact upon moral matters. It does so mostly by 
influencing people's self-assessments as well as the assessments 
that others make of their actions and characters. The distortions of 
judgment which are so often characteristic of shame should not 
obscure the fact that there exists also morally appropriate shame 
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which may lead shame sufferers to seek ways of altering aspects of 
their character. This does not imply that shame is in any sense a 
virtue, or that it can be avoided for any length of time. But, at least 
for a time, “[w]here shame has been, self-acceptance, tolerance, 
competence, and pride can stand” (Morrison, 1996:194).  
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